Security
Identifiers first, then the modelIdentifiers
Program id (devnet)
Cr61UnyT3EmbZLMawbwQksX6QgTrSgEWMxAWUbaYpgNbPoolCtM7TjXbtLkM9rVLDcPdu4M4GFGXzu16ZrnF5jpsVbqbIDL addressCr61UnyT3EmbZLMawbwQksX6QgTrSgEWMxAWUbaYpgNbIDL sha256 (v0.1.0)0cf50f171893f819660d4a2492404f1b7b248a3e89b6a72af6a148bf34d0ebf9Buildnot stamped on this buildThe IDL hash is computed from the IDL file shipped with this build when the page renders; it is never typed in. If the program id above differs from the IDL address, the deployment is pointing the site at a program the IDL was not built for.
Gates enforced on chain
| Gate | Value |
|---|---|
| Price staleness | 120 s |
| TWAP window / min samples / min history | 1800 s / 8 / 300 s |
| Spot vs TWAP pump guard | 1500 bps |
| Max per-update price factor | 100x |
| Conversion min SOL out | oracle floor: TWAP value minus 1500 bps, never lower |
| Router allowlist | Jupiter v6, Orca Whirlpool |
| Token-2022 | allowed; PermanentDelegate and NonTransferable mints refused |
| Borrower consent | the engine cannot convert a healthy loan that the borrower has not armed |
| Admin withdraw | limited to accrued fees above share-backed deposits |
Threat model
| Actor | Goal | Controls |
|---|---|---|
| Borrower | Over-borrow against an inflated or unsellable coin | TWAP-capped price; pump guard; routability at loan size; 30% max LTV; short terms |
| Launcher | Launch, pump, borrow, dump | Two consecutive gate passes above the $50k market-cap line with real volume and liquidity; holder concentration check; delisting; sliced in-vault conversion |
| Outside trader | Manipulate a thin pool at attestation time | 30-minute TWAP with minimum history; per-update factor cap; attestor refuses out-of-band prices; cross-sourced feeds with breaker |
| Compromised engine key | Drain vaults through conversions | Oracle floor, router allowlist and slippage cap enforced by the program; engine cannot withdraw deposits or move collateral outside conversion and liquidation paths |
| Compromised pool authority | Change fee destination, pause, withdraw | admin_withdraw limited to accrued fees; config changes emit events the site surfaces; authority on hardware |
| RPC provider | Serve stale state | Failover across providers; slot-advance check before any fire; staleness window on chain |
| Token-2022 extension abuse | Transfer hooks, permanent delegate | PermanentDelegate refused on chain; extension audit and transfer-hook refusal in the gate |
| Impersonation | Lookalike mints or addresses | Mint registry from launches only; symbol impersonation check; addresses always shown in full with a copy control |
| Phishing site | Clone the UI | Program id and IDL hash on this page; token address published on the site first; no custodial action to phish |
| Operator error | Wrong binary or config | Reproducible build hash; config read from chain state; canaries fail loudly on mismatch |
Operational rules
- No mainnet deploy, pool seeding or live borrow without an audit of the shipped source and an explicit operator go.
- Every privileged key lives outside the repo, backed up, and is never one previously used by another product.
- Secrets are referenced by name only in docs and logs.
- A limit-close or liquidation never fires without the slot-advance check, the feed freshness check and a successful simulation of the exact transaction.
- Any public claim on the site about size, yield or safety is computed from chain state at render time.
Non-goals in version one
Protection against a complete collapse of Solana liquidity for a collateral coin inside the TWAP window. Mitigated by low LTV, short terms and slicing, not eliminated.