Security

Identifiers first, then the model

Identifiers

Program id (devnet)Cr61UnyT3EmbZLMawbwQksX6QgTrSgEWMxAWUbaYpgNbPoolCtM7TjXbtLkM9rVLDcPdu4M4GFGXzu16ZrnF5jpsVbqbIDL addressCr61UnyT3EmbZLMawbwQksX6QgTrSgEWMxAWUbaYpgNbIDL sha256 (v0.1.0)0cf50f171893f819660d4a2492404f1b7b248a3e89b6a72af6a148bf34d0ebf9Buildnot stamped on this build

The IDL hash is computed from the IDL file shipped with this build when the page renders; it is never typed in. If the program id above differs from the IDL address, the deployment is pointing the site at a program the IDL was not built for.

Gates enforced on chain

GateValue
Price staleness120 s
TWAP window / min samples / min history1800 s / 8 / 300 s
Spot vs TWAP pump guard1500 bps
Max per-update price factor100x
Conversion min SOL outoracle floor: TWAP value minus 1500 bps, never lower
Router allowlistJupiter v6, Orca Whirlpool
Token-2022allowed; PermanentDelegate and NonTransferable mints refused
Borrower consentthe engine cannot convert a healthy loan that the borrower has not armed
Admin withdrawlimited to accrued fees above share-backed deposits

Threat model

ActorGoalControls
BorrowerOver-borrow against an inflated or unsellable coinTWAP-capped price; pump guard; routability at loan size; 30% max LTV; short terms
LauncherLaunch, pump, borrow, dumpTwo consecutive gate passes above the $50k market-cap line with real volume and liquidity; holder concentration check; delisting; sliced in-vault conversion
Outside traderManipulate a thin pool at attestation time30-minute TWAP with minimum history; per-update factor cap; attestor refuses out-of-band prices; cross-sourced feeds with breaker
Compromised engine keyDrain vaults through conversionsOracle floor, router allowlist and slippage cap enforced by the program; engine cannot withdraw deposits or move collateral outside conversion and liquidation paths
Compromised pool authorityChange fee destination, pause, withdrawadmin_withdraw limited to accrued fees; config changes emit events the site surfaces; authority on hardware
RPC providerServe stale stateFailover across providers; slot-advance check before any fire; staleness window on chain
Token-2022 extension abuseTransfer hooks, permanent delegatePermanentDelegate refused on chain; extension audit and transfer-hook refusal in the gate
ImpersonationLookalike mints or addressesMint registry from launches only; symbol impersonation check; addresses always shown in full with a copy control
Phishing siteClone the UIProgram id and IDL hash on this page; token address published on the site first; no custodial action to phish
Operator errorWrong binary or configReproducible build hash; config read from chain state; canaries fail loudly on mismatch

Operational rules

  • No mainnet deploy, pool seeding or live borrow without an audit of the shipped source and an explicit operator go.
  • Every privileged key lives outside the repo, backed up, and is never one previously used by another product.
  • Secrets are referenced by name only in docs and logs.
  • A limit-close or liquidation never fires without the slot-advance check, the feed freshness check and a successful simulation of the exact transaction.
  • Any public claim on the site about size, yield or safety is computed from chain state at render time.

Non-goals in version one

Protection against a complete collapse of Solana liquidity for a collateral coin inside the TWAP window. Mitigated by low LTV, short terms and slicing, not eliminated.